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THE CONTINUING PRESENCE OF DRED SCOTT
L. H. LARUy*
Professor Burt says, and correctly so, that Dred Scott v. Sandford' is
the most reviled 2 case in all of constitutional law; but then he also says that
the decision in that case is all too typical. There is a tension between these
two statements. If it is so typical, why do we revile it? We revile it because
we are appalled by Taney's racism, and we have the comfortable feeling of
being superior to Taney on that point. (Perhaps we are.) Nevertheless, Burt
asks us to look beyond that to the "jurisprudence" of the opinion. His claim
is that Chief Justice Taney's jurisprudence resembles the sort of logic and
rhetoric that is present in many of the highly praised decisions of the
Supreme Court. 3 If this is true, then there is a continuity between Dred Scott
and ourselves that we have not thought about.
If there is a continuity, we should investigate it. Burt has done so by
asking about the jurisprudence of our constitutional law. I would like to
take a slightly different, yet compatible, approach to the question of the
continuing presence of Dred Scott among us; I would like to focus on its
legal validity among us. Burt's argument about jurisprudential continuity is
sound, but I wish to supplement it by focusing on the issue of legal continuity.
Prima facie, there ought to be a connection; if there is a jurisprudential
continuity, then it is plausible that there is some continuity in the law of the
case, in the more purely legal issues that were decided therein.
The legal question I would consider is the question of citizenship.
Everyone knows that Dred Scott held that Negroes could not be citizens of
the United States, that "no blacks, white only" was the rule. It is less well
known that a key move in the argument was the bifurcation of citizenship
into two kinds of citizenship: state citizenship and national citizenship. This
dichotomy was absolutely essential, from Taney's point of view. After all,
Taney was an adherent of the state's rights theory of constitutional law, and
so he did not claim the power to say whom the states could declare to be
citizens. Taney did not declare that Massachusetts could not recognize free
blacks as citizens of Massachusetts; he did not care about that. There was,
however, something that he did care about, and rather strongly so. The real
issue (and I agree with Burt on this) is whether Massachusetts's action would
have any national relevance. In particular, if a free black citizen of Massa-
chusetts were to travel to Virginia or South Carolina, would those Southern
* Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University. Prof. LaRue chaired the colloquium
sessions at the Washington and Lee University School of Law, April 10-12, 1984.
1. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
2. Burt, What Was Wrong with Dred Scott, What's Right about Brown, 42 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1, 1 (1985).
3. Id. at 3.
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states have to recognize the soujourner as the as the sort of citizen who is
entitled to the protection of the privileges and immunities clause of article
IV?
What many have failed to bear in mind is that this part of Dred Scott,
the dichotomy of state and national citizenship, is still part of our law to
this day; a fortiori, there has been all too little thought directed toward this
matter, for we cannot think about that which we will not bring to mind.
Therefore, let me start by giving a modern example of the continuing
relevance of the dichotomy. The question will be: Is this particular continuity
with Dred Scott something that is bad or good?
My example is a case titled Sadat v. Mertes.4 It is an appropriate example
for several reasons: it is recent enough to be called "modern", and so it can
not be shrugged off as being a relic of the past; the plaintiff in the case,
Moheb Sadat, was like Dred Scott in that he wanted to sue in federal court
via the diversity jurisdiction route, 5 which was the route to federal jurisdiction
that Scott tried to use;6 and finally, Dred Scott was cited by the Seventh
Circuit as a precedent and as grounds for excluding Sadat from federal
court.
7
The case is an automobile accident suit, and so it is not what we call a
"great" case; there is little about it that would lead most readers to imagine
that great social issues were at stake. Sadat was naturalized in 1973, at which
time he was domiciled in Pennsylvania.' (By the way, a natural-born citizen
could have the same kind of problem, but more about that later.) In the
same year, he accepted a job with the Kohler Company in its overseas
operations in Beirut. 9 He trained in Kohler's Wisconsin office, and then,
while driving to O'Hare Airport en route to Beirut, he had an accident; the
other party involved was domiciled in Wisconsin (and was insured by a
Connecticut insurance company).10
Sadat took up his job in Beirut, but the well-known troubles in Lebanon
had their impact; Kohler eliminated his job and he was stranded in the
Mideast." He moved to Cairo to live with relatives, and while domiciled in
Cairo, he filed suit in federal district court in Wisconsin, alleging diversity
from the Wisconsin and Connecticut defendants.12 According to the judge-
made rules that are part of the gloss on the diversity jurisdiction statute, one
is to determine whether or not the parties are of diverse citizenship as of the
time the lawsuit if filed.' 3 Somewhat later, Sadat returned to the United
4. 615 F.2d 1176 (7th Cir. 1980).
5. See id. at 1178.
6. 60 U.S. at 396-7, 400.
7. 615 F.2d at 1180.
8. See id. at 1178-79.
9. See id. at 1179.
10. See id. at 1178.
11. See id at 1179.
12. See id. at 1178.
13. See 13B C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
3608 (1984), at 448.
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States,' 4 but the facts as to his domicile after his return are irrelevant; the
relevant time is the time of the suit. As of that time, according to the Seventh
Circuit's per curiam opinion, there was no diversity.' 5
The rationale of the Sadat court's opinion is as follows: The statute
requires that the plaintiff and the defendant be citizens of different states;
even though Sadat was a citizen of the United States, he was not a citizen
of any one of the several states; consequently, the requisite diversity was
lacking.' 6 There is much respectable authority for this result; the per curiam
opinion cited a line of eight cases, from 1912 to 1978, for the proposition
that someone who was a citizen of the United States without being a citizen
of one of the several states cannot sue in diversity.' (Furthermore, these
cases are clear on the proposition that this rule applies to both natural-born
and naturalized citizens.) 8 The key step in this logic is the second step: Sadat
could be a citizen of the United States without being a citizen of one of the
several states. The Seventh Circuit cited Dred Scott for the proposition that
there is a dichotomy between state and national citizenship, and it followed
precedent in saying that Sadat was not, according to law, a citizen of any
state. 9 The problem is supposed to be linked to the language of the fourteenth
amendment, which states that citizens of the United States are citizens "of
the State wherein they reside." 20 This is interpreted as stating a federal rule
about the prerequisites of state citizenship: one must reside in a state to be
a citizen of it, a prerequisite that Sadat failed to meet.
2'
The question is whether Sadat v. Mertes is marginal in our law. The
case is an example, and there are many, of cases in which it is asserted that
state and national citizenship are separate and distinct (separate but equal?)
concepts. But what turns on the distinction? For Sadat, federal court
jurisdiction; but is there more? Should we find some great significance in
the fact that the Sadat court cited Dred Scott as authority for the proposition
that there is a disjunction between state and national citizenship? I am
intrigued by the fact that the actual pages of 19 Howard that are cited are
405-06, which are the same pages that Professor Burt has identified as the
core of Dred Scott,2 the pages in which Taney denies that a single state can
grant citizenship so as to require other states to extend comity. Perhaps one
should not make too much of this, but it is a lead that is worth exploring.
To me, this citation identifies a continuity between Dred Scott and the
two leading cases on the fourteenth amendment: the Slaughterhouse Cases23




18. See id. (cases cited therein).
19. See id.
20. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
21. 615 F.2d at 1180.
22. Burt, supra note 2, at 5-8.
23. 16 WaIl. 36 (1873).
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and the Civil Rights Cases.24 Both of these cases have their critics, but the
more routine scholarship of our time treats these cases as having at least
recognized that Dred Scott was overruled by the fourteenth amendment.
Nevertheless, such cases as Hammerstein v. Lyne, 25 which is one of the eight
cases relied upon by Sadat v. Mertes, cite the Slaughterhouse Cases for the
proposition that national and state citizenship are two separate things;
26
Sadat v. Mertes cites Dred Scott for the same proposition; 27 and so one can
sum this up by saying the Sadat case recognizes a clear continuity, on a
question of citizenship, between Dred Scott and the Slaughterhouse Cases.
The Slaughterhouse Cases passed on the constitutionality of a Louisiana
statute that gave a monopoly to the Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and
Slaughter-House Company over all of the slaughtering to be done in the
parishes of Orleans, Jefferson, and St. Bernard. 28 This monopoly was
softened somewhat by imposing upon the company the duty to permit other
butchers to use its facilities, and by regulating the fees that it could charge
the other butchers. 29 In his opinion for the Court, Justice Miller first
summarized the facts, 30 and then turned to the legal issue of whether the
statute in question was within the police power of the state.3 1 He did not
explain exactly why the police power question is a question of federal
constitutional law, but he disposed of it in favor of the validity of the
statute.32 Only then did he proceed to a discussion of the Civil War
amendments, the thirteenth through the fifteenth. The discussion of these
matters constitute the bulk of the opinion (sixteen pages),3 3 but I am interested
in the eight pages34 that he devotes to the question of citizenship.
Justice Miller began his discussion of this issue by stating that the
fourteenth amendment "opens with a definition of citizenship."15 He rec-
ognized that it was something new for our Constitution and that it was
passed to overrule Taney's holding excluding blacks from citizenship.3 6 He
immediately went on to assert, however, that "the distinction between
citizenship of the United States and citizenship of a State is clearly recog-
nized" by the fourteenth amendment. 37 What is truly remarkable about this
conclusion is that it was reached in the most innocent way, as though it were
a simple and elementary deduction from the language of the text. Justice
24. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
25. 200 F. 165 (W.D. Mo., 1912).
26. See id. at 168.
27. See 615 F.2d at 1180.
28. See 16 Wall. at 39-41, 59.
29. See id. at 41-42, 60.
30. 16 Wall. at 57-60.
31. Id. at 60-66.
32. Id. at 66.
33. Id. at 66-83.
34. Id. at 72-80.
35. Id. at 72.
36. See id. at 72-73.
37. Id. at 73.
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Miller failed to ask any questions of policy or history; he did not ask whether
his ruling helped or hindered the overruling of Dred Scott, but the answer
to this unasked question is rather obvious: Miller preserved one of the most
important features of that opinion.
Justice Miller then added injury to the insult by holding that the privileges
and immunities of the two types of citizenship are different, and that the
United States Constitution protects only the national privileges.38 Having
done all of this, he then went on to trivialize the national set: state privileges
and immunities were said to be those "civil right[s] for the establishment
and protection of which organized government is instituted," to be "those
rights which are fundamental. ' 3 9 The national privileges and immunities
were described by way of a motley list, and included such matters as free
access to seaports and the right to have the protection of the national
government "when on the high seas or within the jurisdiction of a foreign
government." 4 Since the national government is empowered to protect only
the national privileges and immunities, according to Miller's reading of the
text, the true import of the bifurcation is that all of the important rights are
left to the protection of the state governments. (And those who are familiar
with the Civil Rights Cases know how this is to work out.)
At this point the Slaughterhouse Cases begin to look like the deep mirror
image of Dred Scott. Taney declared that blacks could not be citizens; and
as Burt has emphasized, 4' the fundamental purpose behind this move was to
prevent blacks from claiming the privileges and immunities of citizenship.
With the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, blacks become citizens,
but Miller gutted the meaning of that by stripping citizenship of any
important legal consequences. So long as blacks cannot be citizens, enormous
importance is attached to the concept; as soon as blacks can become citizens,
the concept is drained of all meaning. (It is this sort of thing that gives
paranoia a good name.)
One can know all of this and dismiss it as unimportant, in that one can
argue that it is no longer historically relevant. One could say: "It is true that
our fundamental rights, whether we be black or white, are not protected via
the privileges and immunities clause, but they are protected nowadays via
the due process clause and the equal protection clause. The point that you
make has been mooted. And the rather odd problem of Moheb Sadat is not
worth worrying about." Indeed, one can go further and argue, as Alexander
Bickel once did, 42 that it is preferable to have our fundamental rights linked
to our being persons, not citizens, for in this way aliens can also enjoy
fundamental rights.
I disagree. First of all, it seems to me that Bickel overstates the legal
38. Id. at 74.
39. Id. at 76.
40. Id. at 79.
41. Burt, supra note 2, at 5-8.
42. Bickel, Citizenship in the American Constitution, 15 ARIZ. L. REv. 369 (1973).
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equality of aliens and citizens. 43 Furthermore, it does not seem true to say
that aliens could not enjoy the protection of fundamental rights if such rights
had been brought within the content of the privileges and immunities clause.
Bickel's error on this point, or so it seems to me, is caused by a hasty
generalization and by his lack of care in examining the historical precedents
and materials that are relevant to the question. Competent lawyers had
offered a sound solution to the difficulty that obsessed Bickel, and yet he
did not respond to these venerable arguments.
The first case in which the question of the relationship of the Bill of
Rights and the fourteenth amendment was clearly raised is Spies v. Illinois.
44
The case was popularly known as the Chicago Anarchist's Case, and involved
the so-called Haymarket Riot, in which a policeman was killed by a bomb.
4 5
Members of the Anarchist Party, who had organized a mass meeting in
Haymarket Square, were charged with responsibility for the murder-by-
bomb, and convicted. 46 On writ of error to the United States Supreme Court,
the legal issue was whether the anarchist had had an "impartial jury.'
'47
John Randolph Tucker, who handled the appeal, argued that the jury trial
provisions of the Bill of Rights were "privileges and immunities, ' 4 and thus
Tucker holds the distinction of being the first lawyer to argue that the
fourteenth amendment "incorporates" the Bill of Rights. In the course of
his argument, he had to face Bickel's problem, for many of his clients were
aliens.
Tucker's solution was straightforward. He summed up his position in a
single sentence: "If the State cannot abridge the privilege of a citizen of the
United States, the same limitation applies to an alien, for no person shall be
denied the equal protection of the laws." ' 49 It seems to me that Tucker
offered a simple and elegant solution to Bickel's problem; Tucker's solution
is not compelled by the force of deductive logic, but it is consistent with the
language and history of the fourteenth amendment. Tucker assembled a list
of fundamental rights from various provisions of the Constitution, including
the Bill of Rights.5 0 He then asserted that these rights comprise the privileges
and immunities of citizenship and that they are protected from state abridg-
ment by the fourteenth.5' Moreover, since the fourteenth extends to aliens
as well as to citizens the guarantee of equal protection of the laws, then it
43. Bickel was relying on Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). However, the
Supreme Court has reversed its position in more recent cases, subsequent to Bickel's article.
See Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
44. 123 U.S. 131 (1887).
43. H. DAvID, THE HISTORY OF =-H HA1sst= AssAm (1937).
46. Spies v. People, 122 II. 1, 12 N.E. 865 (1887).
47. See 123 U.S. at 133-34, 165.
48. Id. at 151 (Tucker's argument for petitioners).
49. Id. at 153.
50. Id. at 150-52.
51. Id. at 152.
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follows, according to Tucker's reading of the text, that aliens are entitled to
enjoy these very same rights.
Nevertheless, this debate between Tucker and Bickel has to do with a
technical question that is not the main point on which I would rest my
critique. I think that Sadat v. Mertes is evidence that the dichotomy of state
and national citizenship is alive and well, and it is clear enough that this
dichotomy has gone together with other things, such as the trivializing of
the privileges and immunities of national citizenship. The long term conse-
quence of this has been that the concept of citizenship has had no importance
in our law. My critique rests on my view that this void in our law is
unfortunate.
This void in our law is bad because it has driven a wedge between
popular talk and legal talk. For many of us, the word "citizen" is a badge
of honor and pride; for the immigrant, to achieve this status is to gain
something wonderful. Furthermore, in political debate, the word "citizen"
is a word that carries weight. In the arena of public opinion, whenever
someone advances a claim based upon his citizenship, he has made a powerful
rhetorical claim. Such a claim, however, means nothing in court, and so
judges have not been able to contribute to this debate, nor to participate in
it. This seems to me to be profoundly important, since it means that our
constitutional law is not able to do something that it customarily does,52 for
it is a significant fact about our constitutional law that it has had its most
powerful effects by binding together law and politics; and yet this binding
has been lacking with reference to citizenship. In other systems of constitu-
tional law, this would be no great problem, but it is important to us. Among
us, constitutional law is one of the ways in which law and politics are
integrated, and yet this is not true for the concept of citizenship. Speaking
only for myself, this seems to be very bad.
Fortunately, this question of the interplay of law and politics, of the
way in which they define each other, is the question on which Professor
Burt is hard at work. His forthcoming book, of which his contribution here
will be the opening chapter, promises to have many worthwhile things to say
about these matters. I hope that he will take on the task of showing how
important it has been to our polity that the concept of citizenship has been
legally vacuous and yet politically significant. If he does, I hope that I will
be vindicated in my judgments about what is good and what is bad in what
has happened.
52. For a thoughtful discussion of the issues that this assertion raises, see J. WHITE,
WHEMN WORDS LOST TrmR MEANiNG 192-274 (1984). The same point is made in a different
context in Freedman, Sex Equality, Sex Differences, and the Supreme Court, 92 YALE L. J.
913, 968 (1983).
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